Robert Sapolsky Is Simply Not Talking About Compatibilism
A viral critique argues the bestselling neuroscience book attacks a strawman version of free will.
A detailed critique by Julius on LessWrong has gone viral, taking aim at Stanford neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky's NYT bestselling book 'Determined.' Julius argues that while Sapolsky effectively presents neuroscience against 'libertarian free will' (a non-deterministic, uncaused choice), he completely fails to engage with 'compatibilism'—the dominant philosophical position that free will is compatible with determinism. Julius asserts Sapolsky's definition of free will is a strawman, ignoring compatibilist frameworks that focus on agency, reasoning, and lack of coercion. The post highlights a significant gap between the book's scientific rigor and its philosophical treatment of its main target.
- Critique targets Sapolsky's misrepresentation of compatibilism, the view held by ~90% of philosophers.
- Argues the book attacks a 'libertarian' strawman of uncaused choice, not modern agency-based definitions.
- Highlights a growing debate on bridging neuroscience with accurate philosophy of mind.
Why It Matters
For AI ethics and alignment, accurately defining agency and responsibility is critical; flawed philosophy undermines the debate.