Researchers propose NEMS for chip-level hardware security against tampering

As hardware security threats intensify across semiconductor manufacturing and supply chains, researchers are turning to novel physical mechanisms. A new paper from Himanandhan Reddy Kottur and colleagues presents Nanoelectromechanical Systems (NEMS) as an emerging class of hardware security primitives that enable physical assurance, tamper detection, and authentication at the device level. The team demonstrates how NEMS-based Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) exploit fabrication-induced nanoscale variability to create unique, unclonable fingerprints. Shape memory materials allow self-reconfiguring locks that can detect physical intrusion, while resonance-based fingerprints use mechanical vibrations for authentication. Unlike conventional digital security methods, NEMS primitives are inherently low-power, resilient to environmental degradation, and resistant to side-channel attacks and reverse engineering. Their mechanical unpredictability adds a layer of physical robustness that is difficult to emulate or clone.

Crucially, NEMS can be integrated into standard semiconductor fabrication workflows without disrupting existing processes, opening the door for scalable, verifiable security in advanced packaging. This approach is particularly valuable for defense, aerospace, and critical infrastructure applications where tamper-proof hardware is essential. The researchers also propose physical unlocking architectures that require specific mechanical stimuli to activate, preventing unauthorized access. By moving security from the digital realm into the physical properties of the chip itself, NEMS offers a fundamental shift in how we protect hardware. The paper, published in IMAPSource Proceedings 2025, highlights that these primitives can be deployed in mainstream consumer electronics as well, promising a future where chips are self-securing at the nanoscale.