Going Public: Communication in Collective Decisions
Public messaging dominates private in principal-agent project launches. Here's why...
A new working paper in theoretical economics (arXiv:2605.03621) by Zhicheng Du, Yingkai Li, and Boli Xu tackles a classic problem: how should a leader (principal) communicate with a group of agents when deciding whether to launch a project? The principal can run a test to learn about an unknown state, then share findings via cheap talk (unverifiable messages). The key twist: the principal can either message all agents publicly or send individual private messages.
The authors prove that public messaging is weakly dominant: any outcome achievable with private messaging can also be achieved with public messaging. In a canonical linear-payoff environment, they find public messaging becomes strictly superior when at least two agents are the principal's 'conflicting allies' — meaning the principal benefits from one agent accepting and the other rejecting. This has implications for board decisions, committee approvals, and any scenario where a leader must rally support from multiple stakeholders.
- Public messaging can replicate any private messaging outcome (weak dominance).
- Strict dominance occurs when two agents are the principal's 'conflicting allies' (one benefits from project, one suffers).
- Paper characterizes optimal testing strategies under linear payoffs for each regime.
Why It Matters
Public communication may be strategically superior in team decisions, from startups to government approvals.