LessWrong's cluelessness argument challenges impartial altruism under radical uncertainty

In a detailed LessWrong post, Anthony DiGiovanni presents the 'unawareness argument' for cluelessness, framing it as a challenge to impartial altruism. The argument claims that to justify preferring action A over B on impartial altruistic grounds, we must 'expect' that an idealized version of us would assign A higher expected value across all cosmic consequences (normative premise). However, if our understanding of those consequences is too coarse-grained—as it is due to unawareness (empirical premise)—then we cannot even compare the expected values of the two actions (conceptual premise). Therefore, no action is justified over any other from an impartial perspective. The post breaks down the three premises and invites targeted critiques, noting the EA Forum's competition ending August 14, 2026. DiGiovanni emphasizes that cluelessness does not render all values irrelevant; local moral norms like compassion, honesty, and rule-following remain action-guiding.

This argument matters deeply for the EA and AI alignment communities, where long-termist and impartial frameworks drive resource allocation and research prioritization. If cluelessness holds, it undercuts the justification for many EA interventions, from AI safety funding to global health projects. DiGiovanni's framing—and the call for external critique—aims to refine or refute the logic before it shapes policy. He acknowledges that cluelessness might lead to 'nothing we do matters' nihilism, but counters that other, more immediate values survive. The post represents a significant epistemological challenge that could reshape debate around how to weigh uncertain, large-scale impacts, making it essential reading for anyone working in altruistic decision theory or AI governance.