New paper shows how adversarial observations threaten RL systems and how to defend them
Researchers reveal how subtle sensor attacks can break RL agents' state inference and policy decisions.
A new preprint from researchers M. Santos-Pascual and D. RÃos Insua tackles a critical vulnerability in reinforcement learning (RL) systems: adversarial attacks on the observation stream. The paper, titled "Adversarial observations in probabilistic State-Space Models for robust Reinforcement Learning," focuses on linear probabilistic state-space models (SSMs) that are commonly used in RL architectures for latent state inference. The authors model an attacker who subtly perturbs observations while staying within likelihood constraints to avoid detection. These adversarial perturbations propagate through the SSM, corrupting the estimated latent state and ultimately misleading the RL policy. The analysis reveals how even small, strategically crafted observation shifts can cause significant degradation in decision quality.
The work is particularly relevant for safety-critical applications such as robotics, autonomous driving, and industrial control, where sensors are prone to noise, partial failures, or deliberate tampering. By formalizing the attack surface and its impact on both inference and control, the authors lay out a principled pathway toward designing RL systems that are robust to adversarial observations. The paper includes 29 pages, 7 figures, and is currently a preprint undergoing ongoing work. It bridges techniques from statistical machine learning, control theory, and adversarial robustness, offering a unified framework that could inform future defense mechanisms.
- The paper analyzes adversarial attacks on linear probabilistic state-space models (SSMs) used in RL.
- Attackers alter observations under likelihood constraints to remain undetected, corrupting latent state inference.
- The framework directly applies to safety-critical domains like robotics, where sensor noise and failures are common.
Why It Matters
A foundation for building RL systems resilient to sensor tampering in autonomous and safety-critical applications.